Article contributed by DefSEC Analytics, Ghana - March 2026

Regional cooperation cannot be ignored in ensuring effective security in the Lake Chad Basin.

In 2024, Chad threatened to withdraw from the Multi-national Joint Task Force (MNJTF) that has been responsible for fighting extremism in the Lake Chad Basin. This threat was significant because Chad has historically played a leading military role in the region, often deploying some of the most experienced and battle-hardened troops. A withdrawal by Chad would not only weaken the operational strength of the MNJTF but also undermine the political unity that the force symbolizes. Such a move risked creating a ripple effect, potentially encouraging other member states to reconsider their commitments and thereby eroding the collective framework that has been carefully built over time

Member states of the MNJTF have been Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. These states are also members of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, an organization originally established to manage shared water resources but which has increasingly taken on security responsibilities due to the region’s deteriorating stability. The overlap in membership between these two bodies highlights the recognition that environmental challenges, economic pressures, and security threats are deeply intertwined. However, shared membership does not automatically translate into seamless cooperation; differences in national priorities, political systems, and levels of commitment often complicate joint efforts.

The reason Chad gave for issuing the statement was what it believed to be the ineffectiveness of the force that was supposed to fight Boko Haram and IS West African Province (ISWAP) in the region. N’Djamena felt its forces were left to fight the menace alone, bearing a disproportionate share of the operational burden while other partners lagged in contributions. This perception of imbalance is particularly dangerous in coalition warfare, where trust and equitable burden-sharing are essential. If one state feels overextended and under-supported, it can lead to frustration, reduced morale, and ultimately disengagement, which weakens the entire alliance.

 

In late March last year, it was announced that Niger has left the MNJTF over tensions with some member states, especially Nigeria. While recent news suggests the country has, in fact, not withdrawn its forces, the earlier announcement gave discouraging signals about the cohesion of the alliance. Even the perception of disunity can embolden extremist groups, who closely monitor political and military developments among their adversaries. Such tensions may stem from broader geopolitical disagreements, internal political changes, or disputes over operational control, but regardless of the cause, they undermine the effectiveness of joint security initiatives.


The signal is that the force that was initiated by former Nigerian military leader Sani Abacha to fight banditry in the early 1990s, and was subsequently revamped to fight terrorism, could be standing on two legs instead of four. This metaphor underscores the fragility of the MNJTF in its current state. A coalition that was designed to draw strength from unity risks becoming significantly weakened if key members disengage or reduce their participation. The historical evolution of the force, from addressing localized banditry to confronting transnational terrorism, makes its current challenges even more concerning, as the threats it faces today are far more sophisticated and dangerous.


Currently, Boko Haram and ISWAP have ramped up attacks in the region. These groups have demonstrated increasing tactical sophistication, employing improvised explosive devices (IEDs), drone technology, and coordinated assaults on both military and civilian targets. The escalation in violence has resulted in significant casualties, displacement of communities, and destruction of infrastructure. These developments have contributed to the Lake Chad Basin and the broader Sahel being labeled as epicenters of global terrorism. The persistence and adaptability of these groups highlight the limitations of fragmented responses and the urgent need for a unified strategy.
 

While countries in the sub-region currently focus on domestic measures in battling extremists, the real answer lies with multinational cooperation. National efforts, though necessary, are often constrained by limited resources, jurisdictional boundaries, and the inability to pursue threats beyond borders. In contrast, a coordinated regional approach allows for synchronized operations, shared intelligence, and a more comprehensive understanding of the threat landscape. It also sends a strong message of unity and resolve, which can serve as a deterrent to extremist groups seeking to exploit divisions.

Firstly, the porous borders between and among the countries in the Basin make cooperation imperative. These borders are vast, often poorly demarcated, and difficult to monitor effectively, allowing militants to move freely between countries to evade capture. The situation is further complicated by overlapping ethnic groups and longstanding patterns of cross-border movement that predate modern state boundaries. As a result, purely national approaches to border security are insufficient. Joint border patrols, coordinated surveillance, and shared border management strategies are essential to closing these gaps.


Moreover, with the high mobility of extremists in the region, intelligence sharing will continue to be critical to combating them. Timely and accurate intelligence can mean the difference between preventing an attack and responding to one after the fact. However, intelligence sharing requires a high level of trust, standardization of communication systems, and mechanisms for protecting sensitive information. Unilateral actions are not enough to achieve this; without collaboration, intelligence remains fragmented and less effective, reducing the ability of states to anticipate and disrupt extremist activities.


Furthermore, with states in the region having acquired different levels of military and security capabilities, augmenting each other will be a rational decision to achieve efficacy in the fight. Some countries may have more advanced surveillance technologies, while others possess greater experience in ground operations or counterinsurgency tactics. Leveraging these complementary strengths can significantly enhance the overall effectiveness of the coalition. For example, states that have developed expertise in drone operations can provide critical support in reconnaissance and targeted strikes, thereby improving situational awareness and operational precision.
 

Despite the emergence of different political systems in the region, collective security must be prioritized by decision-makers. Political differences, whether stemming from governance structures, leadership changes, or ideological orientations, should not overshadow the shared threat posed by extremist groups. Security cooperation must be insulated, as much as possible, from political disputes to ensure continuity and effectiveness. Extremists are highly opportunistic and acutely aware of the advantages they gain from disunity among states. They will exploit any fractures, whether political, military, or diplomatic, to strengthen their position and expand their operations.
 

In addition, the adoption of modern technology is becoming increasingly vital in strengthening security efforts across the Lake Chad Basin. Emerging tools such as satellite surveillance, unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), biometric identification systems, and advanced data analytics can significantly enhance the capacity of states to monitor, predict, and respond to threats. For instance, drones can provide real-time intelligence on militant movements in remote and inaccessible areas, while data-driven systems can help identify patterns in attacks and improve strategic planning. Integrating such technologies into joint operations not only improves efficiency but also reduces the risks faced by personnel on the ground. However, to fully benefit from these innovations, member states must invest in training, ensure interoperability of systems, and establish shared technological frameworks that support collective action rather than isolated use.